This technical Appendix discusses some welfare results in sections 3 and 4 of the paper that are not formally proven there. We will show three results:
utility as a function of the price level and the correlation ρ between M and M * . The proof will be in two steps:
Step 1: U (P fixed , 1) < U(P fixed , ρ f loat )
Step 2: U (P fixed , ρ float ) < U(P float , ρ float ) Subscripts refer to the respective exchange rate system. We now Þrst prove step 1. For a given price level the expected value of u(c) is clearly the same under both systems because the unconditional distribution of M is the same. It is therefore sufficient to show that at a given price level E(v(l)) is higher when ρ = corr(M, M * ) is less than one. As in the proof of Lemma 1, we assume without loss of generality that the state space is [0, 2Z] and that (because of symmetric
where π(.) is the probability density function. For a given price level P , it follows that
Since v(.) is a concave function, v(0.5x + 0.5y) > 0.5v(x) + 0.5v(y). Substituting x = 1 − 0.5M (z)/P and y = 1 − 0.5M (z + Z)/P , this proves that E(v(l)) is larger under a ßoat, which completes the proof of step 1. In order to prove step two, it is sufficient to show that: In order to prove (i), deÞne the function g(P ) = (µ − 1)Eu c M − µEv l M . From price equation (14) (using p H = P ), in equilibrium g(P ) = 0. Also ∂g(P )/∂P > 0. It is therefore sufficient to show that for any given P , g(P ) is lower under a Þxed exchange rate system than under a ßoat. Since for a given price level Eu c M is the same under both systems, it is sufficient to show that Ev l M is lower under a ßoat for any P . DeÞne
. This proves (i), which completes the proof of Result 1.
Proof of Result 2
Utility
From price equation (14), E(u c + αl)M = (µ/(µ − 1))E(1 + αc)M at ρ = 1 (since p H = P under a Þxed exchange rate system). Using this, the expression above simpliÞes to
Note that E(M) + αE(M 2 )/P is always positive, even for α negative. This is because the marginal utility of leisure must be positive for all states of the world, so that 1 + αc = 1 + αM/P must always be positive. Utility therefore depends negatively on an increase in the price level.
In order to compute ∂P/∂ρ, we fully differentiate the following equation, obtained by adding price equations (14) and (15):
Doing so yields
.
The denominator is positive except for α very negative. We can rule this case out as it corresponds to "unstable" price setting. If the denominator were negative, ∂p H /∂P in the price equation (14) would be larger than one. This leads to explosive price setting behavior. If, for example due to a change in ρ, individual Þrms wish to raise their price for a given aggregate price index, the aggregate index will rise as well, leading to a further increase in prices charged by individual Þrms, etc.
When ∂p H /∂P > 1, this process explodes.
It is now clear from (A2) and (A3) that a drop in ρ lowers the price level and raises welfare when α > 0, while it raises the price level and lowers welfare when α < 0. This completes the proof of Result 2.
Proof of Result 3
Write utility as u(c, l) = a c c − b c c 2 + a l l − b l l 2 . In order to be as general as possible, we will consider simultaneously uncertainty about money supplies, government spending G and technology A. In that case
where L p and L G represent private and public sector labor demand. Total labor demand is L = L p + L G . We now marginally differentiate expected utility with respect to γ (parameter of the monetary policy rules), evaluated at γ = 0 (Þxed exchange rate). It is assumed that γ affects neither the expected level of money supplies nor the public price level p G . Let U (γ) be expected utility as a function of γ. Differentiating expected utility at γ = 0, using ∂P/∂γ = 0.5∂p H /∂γ + 0.5∂p * H /∂γ, we obtain
Substituting (4) into (20), using that p H = P at γ = 0, it follows that (µ − 1)Eu c (M − G) = µEu l (M − G)/A. Substituting this, we obtain
In order to compute ∂P/∂γ, we use that from the price equations (20) and (21), after substituting (4),
Differentiating (A6), holding p G constant, using ∂P/∂γ = 0.5∂p H /∂γ +0.5∂p * H /∂γ and the deÞnitions of c and l, we Þnd:
Holding prices constant,
Similarly, holding prices constant and using labor demand from (A4),
Using these results in (A7) gives
In the absence of government spending cov(L, L p ) = var(l). It then follows from (A5) and (A8) that the change in expected utility depends negatively on a weighted average of the change in the variance of consumption and leisure, with weights dependent on the degree of risk aversion with respect to consumption and leisure. With government spending the change in expected utility also depends negatively on the change in the covariance between total labor demand and private sector labor demand, as this affects the price level.
For the speciÞc rules considered in sections 4.2 and 4.3 the variance of leisure decreases under a ßoat and is therefore negatively related to γ. Since the variance of consumption increases with γ, the total welfare impact depends on the weights b c and b l in (A5) and (A8), which are, respectively, the rates of risk-aversion with respect to consumption and leisure. For example, when b c is large compared to b l , the impact on the consumption variance dominates so that welfare is lower under a ßoat (when γ increases).
